- Introduction to The Nicomachean Ethics
-
Proem (Book I, cc. i-iii)
- Purpose: Acquire/propagate knowledge for practical application.
- Conditions: General education, good habits.
-
Nature and Formation of Character (Book I, cc. iv-xii)
- Principle: Human life is only intelligible when viewed as involving an ideal element.
- Human Activity: Oriented to a single, knowable end.
-
"Moral Virtue":
- Permanent state of will, steady obedience to a rule.
- Rules regulate natural impulses within limits.
- Doctrine of the Mean: Virtues flanked by vices of excess/defect.
-
Book VI Aims:
- Describe intellect, its forms, and relation to character.
- Theoretical Wisdom: Eternal laws, no direct conduct relation.
- Practical Wisdom: Master science of human life, right conduct rules.
-
Book X: Pleasure:
- Psychological Question: Natural concomitant/index of perfect activity.
- Ethical Question: Value rises/falls with activity; best pleasures with best activity.
-
Moral Ideal:
- Leads to an Ideal beyond, giving it meaning.
- Best life in the State operating through Law.
-
Discussion of Character:
-
Philosophy of Human Conduct merging into metaphysics.
-
Features:
- Teleological view: Activity directed toward a simple End.
- Value derives from efficiency as means to Happiness.
- Right action presupposes thought/calculation of means to an end.
-
-
- Book I - The Chief Good
-
Chapter I: Every art and every scientific enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is deemed to aim at some good.
- The good is that at which all things aim.
- Differences in ends:
- Some ends are activities.
- Other ends are products distinct from the activities.
- When activities are directed to a further end, the end is superior.
- Examples of hierarchical ends:
- Horsemanship: Aims at making bridles and horse-furniture.
- Military art: Encompasses horsemanship and all actions connected with war.
- The ends of master-arts are more choice-worthy because subordinate activities are pursued for the sake of the former.
-
Chapter II: The Chief Good is the object of πολιτικὴ (Political Science)
- Political science determines which sciences should be studied in communities.
- It uses other practical sciences like military art, domestic management, and rhetoric.
- The end of political science includes the ends of other sciences and is the Good of Man.
- The good of the community is greater and more perfect than that of an individual.
- Achieving the good for a nation or communities is more noble and godlike than achieving it for a single individual.
-
Chapter III: Exactness should not be sought in all discussions alike.
- The educated person seeks exactness according to the subject matter.
- It is absurd to accept persuasion from a mathematician or demand demonstration from a rhetorician.
- Discussions about noble and just matters admit of much dispute.
- The study is for practical purposes; the aim is not mere knowledge but to become good.
- Conditions for profitable study:
- Experience of life
- Freedom from following passion
- Knowledge will be unprofitable to those who lack self-control.
- Knowledge is profitable to those who act in accordance with reason.
- The student, the spirit, and the object are important.
-
Chapter IV: Happiness is generally admitted to be the Chief Good
- Happiness is the starting-point.
- Men form notions of the Chief Good from different modes of life.
- Three prominent lines of life:
- Life of sensual enjoyment: perceived by the "many and most low".
- Life in society.
- Life of contemplation.
- The life of money-making is rejected because wealth is a means to an end, not the end itself.
-
Chapter V: Examination of the popular notions about the Chief Good
- Good cannot be something common to all things, sharing one idea.
- Different individual things are called good by:
- Being from one source.
- All conducing to one end.
- Analogy (intellect to soul as sight to body).
- Even if there is one common good, it cannot be the object of human action.
- The aim is to find something attainable by man.
-
Chapter VI: Further objections against the ἰδέα (Form) of Good
- It is best to first sketch the Chief Good roughly and fill it in later.
- Time is a good discoverer, improving the sketch.
- Do not seek exactness in all matters alike.
- The carpenter and geometrician inquire into the right line differently.
-
Chapter VII: Definition of Happiness
- Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way of perfect excellence.
- A statesman wishes to make citizens good and obedient to the laws.
- The investigation of happiness belongs to πολιτικὴ.
-
Chapter VIII: An outline of the parts of the Soul
- The statesman is to consider the nature of the Soul.
- The Soul consists of two parts:
- Irrational
- Common to all living things, including plants.
- Cause of nutrition and growth.
- Vegetative.
- Appetitive: Desires in conflict with reason.
- Rational
- Obeys reason.
- Possesses reason within itself.
- Irrational
-
Chapter IX-XII: The nature of Excellence
- Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains.
- It is increased or marred by circumstances.
- Men must do just actions to become just.
- Things in the mind are of three kinds:
- Feelings: lust, anger, fear, joy, etc..
- Capacities: abilities to feel.
- States: relation to feelings (good or bad).
- Virtue is a state.
- Virtue is a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason.
- It is a middle state between excess and defect.
- The mean is praiseworthy, and we must deflect towards excess or defect to find it.
- We must consider particular instances.
- The Mean state is Courage.
- The Mean state is perfected Self-Mastery.
- There are three states in each case: two faulty (excess or defect) and one right (mean).
- The mean state is praiseworthy.
- Deflect towards excess or defect to hit the mean.
-
Chapter XIII: The relation of πολιτικὴ to Moral Virtue
- Courage has objects of fear much more than boldness.
-
-
Chapter I: Human Excellence
-
Two Kinds of Excellence
-
Intellectual Excellence:
-
Springs from teaching.
-
Needs experience and time.
-
Moral Excellence (Virtue):
-
Comes from custom (habit).
-
Not implanted by nature.
-
We are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving the virtues.
-
Perfected through custom.
-
Habituation from childhood makes all the difference.
-
Analogy: Things learned by doing
-
"For instance, men become builders by building, and harp-players by playing the harp".
-
"So too, we become just by doing just actions, perfected in self-mastery by doing actions of self-mastery, and brave by doing brave actions".
-
Chapter II: The Importance of Action in Forming Habits
-
Treatise's Object:
-
Not mere speculation, but to become virtuous.
-
Aims at providing instruction to become good.
-
Quality of Habits:
-
Depends on particular actions.
-
"... for the habits generated are in each instance correspondent in character to the acts".
-
Actions and States:
-
"... it makes a vast difference whether the habits be contracted in one way or the other, even from early youth".
-
Chapter III: Virtue and Action
-
Statement:
-
Men must do just actions to become just, and those of self-mastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery.
-
Clarification:
-
Doing an action by chance or suggestion differs from doing it "virtue-wise".
-
Analogy with the arts:
-
A man may produce something grammatical by chance but is only a grammarian when he does so "grammarian-wise".
-
Principle:
-
"... actions are not enough to cause the generating of the states, but they must be of a certain kind".
-
Men become builders by building, and harp-players by playing the harp.
-
By doing just actions we become just.
-
To do actions in a just and self-mastered way, they must:
-
Proceed from (1) knowledge, then from (2) deliberate moral choice, and (3) a firm and unchangeable character.
-
Importance of Doing:
-
"...if this be not the case, in respect of the performing of actions of justice and perfected self-mastery, the agent has not any real goodness".
-
It is not enough to know, but to do.
-
Chapter IV: Virtue as a State of Character
-
Considerations:
-
Feelings (πάθη):
-
Pleasure and pain.
-
Lust, anger, fear, joy, pity.
-
"...in short all things which are attended by pleasure or pain".
-
Capacities (δυνάμεις):
-
"... those faculties in right of which we are said to be capable of these feelings; as, for instance, that whereby we are able to be angered or grieved or to have compassion".
-
States of Character (ἕξεις):
-
"... in right of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the feelings above mentioned; if, for instance, our disposition is too vehement or too languid in respect of being angered, it is ill; but if it be in the moderate degree, it is well".
-
Virtue as a State:
-
Virtue must be one of these three things, i.e. "Feelings, Capacities, States".
-
Virtue is a state, not a feeling or capacity.
-
Feelings are not subjects of moral choice.
-
We are not praised or blamed for feelings alone.
-
How states are generated, marred, or exerted:
-
Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains.
-
Increased or marred by circumstances.
-
Chapter V: Virtue as a Mean
-
Definitions:
-
Genus: State of character.
-
Differentia:
-
Apt to exercise deliberate choice.
-
Being in the relative mean.
-
Determined by reason.
-
The Mean:
-
Between two vices.
-
Excess and defect.
-
Relative to us.
-
Determined by reason.
-
"... the rule by which the prudent man would define it".
-
Application to Actions and Feelings:
-
"... admits of excess and defect and the mean".
-
"... may feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, compassion, and pleasure and pain generally, both too much and too little, and in both cases wrongly; but to feel them when we ought, on what occasions, towards whom, and in what manner, that is, to feel them in the mean, is both the best and the right state, and this is the property of virtue".
-
Examples:
-
Courage: Mean between rashness (excess) and cowardice (defect).
-
Perfected Self-Mastery: Mean between utter want of self-control and insensibility.
-
Chapter VI: The Nature of the Mean
-
Considerations:
-
In every action, there is excess, defect, and the mean.
-
"... the extremes are opposed not only to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to the extremes".
-
The mean is praiseworthy.
-
We must deflect towards excess or defect to find the mean.
-
The Mean as Relative:
-
"... in reference to the thing itself and abstractedly, it is the centre or point equally distant from either extreme; but relatively to us, it is not so".
-
Example: If 10 is too much and 2 is too little, 6 may be the abstract mean but not the relative mean for a trainer.
-
Difficulty in Attaining the Mean:
-
"... for in all things the mean is most praiseworthy, but the extremes are wrong, and of these the defect is less wrong than the excess".
-
Chapter VII: Examples of the Mean in Specific Virtues
-
Virtues and their Means:
-
Courage:
-
Mean state.
-
Defect: Cowardliness.
-
Excess: Rashness.
-
Pleasure and Pain:
-
Mean: Perfected Self-Mastery.
-
Defect: No people are really chargeable with it, called insensibility.
-
Excess: absence of Self-control.
-
Giving and taking wealth:
-
Mean: Liberality.
-
Defect: Stinginess.
-
Excess: Prodigality.
-
Honor (small):
-
Mean: Due sense of honor.
-
Defect: Want of ambition.
-
Excess: Ambitiousness.
-
Anger:
-
Mean: Meekness.
-
Defect: Phlegmatic.
-
Excess: Cross-grained.
-
Social Intercourse:
-
Mean: Courtesy.
-
Defect: Surliness.
-
Excess: Obsequiousness.
-
Truth:
-
Mean: Straightforwardness.
-
Defect: Ironical depreciation.
-
Excess: Boastfulness.
-
Amusement:
-
Mean: easy pleasantry.
-
Defect: clownishness.
-
Excess: buffoonery.
-
Wealth (Giving and Taking):
-
Mean: Liberality.
-
Excess: Prodigality.
-
Defect: Stinginess.
-
"...the prodigal gives out too much and takes in too little, while the stingy man takes in too much and gives out too little".
-
Wealth (Large Scale):
-
Mean: Magnificence.
-
Related to fitting expense on a large scale.
-
Honour (Great):
-
Mean: Great-mindedness.
-
"...implies, that great things are its object-matter".
-
Social Intercourse:
-
"...those who carry on this intercourse with a view to pleasure and pain".
-
Note:
-
Some virtues/vices don't have proper names.
-
These details are from the "well-known scheme".
-
Chapter VIII: The Opposition of the Virtues and Vices
-
Three States:
-
Two faulty (excess or defect).
-
One right, which is the mean state.
-
Opposition:
-
All are opposed to one another.
-
"...the extremes, for instance, not only to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to the extremes".
-
Mean's Appearance:
-
"...the half is greater if compared with the less portion, and less if compared with the greater, so the mean states, compared with the defects, exceed, whether in feelings or actions, and vice versa".
-
The brave man shows as rash when compared with the coward and cowardly when compared with the rash.
-
Practical Application:
-
The mean state is praiseworthy.
-
Deflect sometimes towards excess sometimes towards defect because this will be the easiest method of hitting on the mean, that is, on what is right.
-
Chapter IX: Practical Rules for Attaining the Mean
-
Three Rules:
-
Avoid the extreme which is more opposed to the mean.
-
Notice whither we ourselves are most inclined.
-
"...we should drag ourselves in the contrary direction; because by forcing ourselves far from that to which we incline, we shall arrive at the mean".
-
Guard especially against pleasure.
-
"...we are not impartial judges of it".
-
- Book II - Virtue
-
Chapter I: Virtue is Acquired by Habituation
- Human Excellence:
- Intellectual
- Moral
- Acquisition:
- Intellectual excellence requires teaching, experience, and time.
- Moral excellence arises from habit/custom.
- Nature vs. Habit:
- Virtues are not natural.
- Nature gives us the capacity, habit perfects.
- Importance of Habituation:
- Habituation from childhood is crucial in forming moral character.
- Training in habits is necessary for studying moral philosophy, as it either instills principles or makes one capable of accepting them.
- Human Excellence:
-
Chapter II: Virtue is Not Speculative But Practical
- Purpose of Study:
- Not speculation, but to become good.
- Knowledge is not enough; one must act.
- Practical Application:
- Must consider how to perform particular actions.
- Habits are formed based on these actions.
- Analogy to Sick People:
- Like sick people who listen to the doctor but do nothing, people who take refuge in talk but do not perform virtuous actions will not become good.
- Purpose of Study:
-
Chapter III: Virtue is Concerned with Pleasure and Pain
- Virtue and Moral experience:
- Moral experience is necessary to understand moral principles and to apply them.
- Moral virtue has pleasures and pains as its object-matter.
- Actions:
- Men must do just actions to become just and those of self-mastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery.
- Virtues are formed in a man by his doing the actions.
- Pleasure and Pain:
- Virtue has pleasure and pain for its object-matter.
- Men should be trained from childhood to receive pleasure and pain from proper objects.
- Virtue and Moral experience:
-
Chapter IV: The Characteristics of Virtuous Actions
- Conditions for Virtuous Actions:
- Knowledge: The agent must know what he is doing.
- Choice: The agent must choose the act for its own sake.
- Principle: The action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.
- Inner Disposition:
- To be just, actions must be done with certain inward dispositions, which is neither easy nor entirely within one's control.
- To be a good man, one must do each act in a particular frame of mind: from moral choice and for the sake of the things themselves which are done.
- Wisdom Required:
- Knowing what is just and unjust is thought to require no great wisdom because it is not hard to comprehend those things of which the laws speak.
- To be just, actions must be done and distributed in a certain manner, and this is more difficult than knowing what things are wholesome.
- Conditions for Virtuous Actions:
-
Chapter V: Virtue as a State of Character
- Excellence Defined:
- All excellence causes its subject to be in a good state and to perform its work well.
- Virtue:
- A state that makes a person good and enables them to perform their proper work well.
- A state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine.
- Excellence Defined:
-
Chapter VI: Virtue as a Mean Between Extremes
- Feelings and Actions:
- In feelings and actions, it is possible to have excess, defect, and the mean.
- Virtue aims at the mean.
- The Mean:
- The mean is feeling emotions at the right time, on the right occasions, toward the right people, for the right purpose, and in the right manner, which is the best state.
- Extremes:
- The extremes (excess and defect) are always wrong.
- One may go wrong in many different ways, but right only in one.
- Application:
- Goodness is rare, praiseworthy, and noble because finding the mean is difficult.
- Feelings and Actions:
-
Chapter VII: Examples of the Mean in Particular Virtues
- Need for Specificity:
- General statements of virtue as a mean must be applied to particular instances, or they have an air of vagueness.
- Actions must be in detail, so general statements must hold good in detail to be worthwhile.
- Examples:
- Fear and Confidence:
- Mean: Courage
- Excess: Rashness
- Defect: Cowardice
- Pleasure and Pain:
- Mean: Perfected Self-Mastery
- Excess: Absence of Self-Control
- Defect: Insensibility
- Giving and Taking Wealth:
- Mean: Liberality
- Excess: Prodigality
- Defect: Stinginess
- Greatness of Soul:
- Mean: Greatness of Soul
- Anger:
- Mean: Meekness
- Excess: Passionateness
- Defect: Angerlessness
- Social Intercourse:
- Mean: Friendliness
- Excess: Complaisant or Flatterer
- Defect: Quarrelsome and Cross
- Fear and Confidence:
- Moral Sense:
- The decision in particulars rests with the Moral Sense.
- It is no easy matter to define how, and with what persons, and at what kind of things, and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point a person is right or is wrong.
- Need for Specificity:
-
Chapter VIII: The Opposition of the Virtues and Vices
-
Three States:
- Two faulty (excess or defect).
- One right, which is the mean state.
-
Opposition:
- All are opposed to one another.
- "...the extremes, for instance, not only to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to the extremes".
-
Mean's Appearance:
- "...the half is greater if compared with the less portion, and less if compared with the greater, so the mean states, compared with the defects, exceed, whether in feelings or actions, and vice versa".
- The brave man shows as rash when compared with the coward and cowardly when compared with the rash.
-
Extremes' Contrariety:
- The contrariety between the extremes is greater than between either and the mean because they are further from one another than from the mean.
-
Deviations:
- In some cases, the excess is most opposed to the mean, and in others, the defect.
- This is due to the nature of the thing itself or our own constitution.
-
Practical Application:
- The mean state is praiseworthy.
- Deflect sometimes towards excess, sometimes towards defect, because this will be the easiest method of hitting on the mean, that is, on what is right.
-
-
- Book III - Moral Virtue and Choice
-
Chapter I: Voluntary and Involuntary Actions
- Virtue's Concern: Virtue is concerned with the regulation of feelings and actions.
- Praise and Blame: Praise and blame arise upon actions that are voluntary, while for the involuntary, allowance is made, and sometimes compassion is excited.
- Legislative Use: Drawing out the distinction between what is voluntary and what involuntary is certainly useful for legislators when assigning honors and punishments.
-
Chapter II: Moral Choice
- Voluntary vs. Moral Choice: Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive; voluntary is the more comprehensive term.
- Children and animals share in voluntary action but not in Moral Choice.
- Sudden actions are voluntary but are not ascribed to Moral Choice.
- Definition: Moral Choice seems most intimately connected with Virtue and is a more decisive test of moral character than a man’s acts. Moral Choice is defined as "Will consequent on deliberation".
- Deliberation: Moral Choice implies reasoning and an intellectual element. The object of Deliberation is not Ends, but the means to Ends.
- Wish: The first step is a Wish, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind.
- Decision and Will: Deliberation is followed by Decision, and finally, the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected; the two last constitute Moral Choice in its full meaning.
- Voluntary vs. Moral Choice: Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive; voluntary is the more comprehensive term.
-
Chapter III: Deliberation
- Object of Deliberation: Deliberation concerns things in our power that can be done. Men deliberate not about ends, but about means to ends.
- Good Counsel: In seeking good counsel, one considers how to achieve an end and what will bring it about most easily and best. Deliberation involves thinking out means to ends.
- Limits of Deliberation: Deliberation does not apply to eternal things, matters of chance, or all human affairs, but to issues that are commonly produced, in which the issue is obscure or indeterminate.
-
Chapter IV: Wish
- Wish Defined: Wish relates more to the end, deliberation to the means.
- Objects of Wish: Some think the object of Wish is the good, others that it is what appears good.
- For those who say that good is the object of Wish, it follows that a man who makes a wrong choice does not really wish at all.
- Real vs. Apparent Good: What is wished for is, in real truth, good, but to each individual that which conveys to his mind the impression of being good to himself.
- The Good Man: The good man wishes for that which is really good, the bad man wishes for anything.
-
Chapter V: Responsibility
- Virtue and Vice: As the sight depends upon the power purely of the individual and is not his own fault Virtue is in our power in like manner Vice is also.
- Actions vs. Habits: We are masters of our actions from beginning to end but only of the origination of our habits.
- Voluntary Action: It rested with us to use our circumstances this way or that.
-
Chapter VI: Courage Defined
- Fear and Confidence: Courage is employed about the feelings of fear and confidence.
- Objects of Fear: Men fear what are accounted terrible. The object of fear is what appears to be evil; hence men fear disgrace, poverty, disease, friendship, death.
- The Brave Man: The brave man will fear poverty and disease but not being unjustly dealt with, or disgrace. The Brave man is he who faces what is terrible to man, or in so far as he faces it bravely.
- Suicide: To die to escape from poverty or love or anything that is merely painful is the part of a coward, not of a brave man.
- The Motive: The motive of the Brave man is honor.
-
Chapter VII: The Sphere of Courage
- Death in Battle: The greatest trial of courage is death in battle because it is death encountered in the noblest and most honorable circumstances.
- Experience: Experience in particular matters also contributes to courage; hence Socrates thought that courage was knowledge.
- Sources of Error: Men are exposed to danger, knowing how to meet it from their familiarity with the circumstances and knowing in what respects they have the advantage.
-
Chapter VIII: Spurious Forms of Courage
- Courage of Citizenship: The motives which are thought to actuate the members of a community in braving danger are the penalties and disgrace held out by the laws to cowardice, and the dignities conferred on the Brave.
- Experience: Those also appear brave who have experience in particular dangers.
- Animal Spirit: They are thought to be Brave who are carried on by mere Animal Spirit, as are wild beasts against those who have wounded them, because the really Brave have much Spirit.
- Hopefulness: The hopeful are brave, but their courage fails when the danger is found to be not what they supposed.
- Ignorance: Ignorance makes men face danger, but when they find out the truth they would turn and flee.
-
Chapter IX: The Characteristics of Courage
- Definition: Courage is the mean state with respect to feelings of confidence and fear.
- Choice and Motive: The motive of the brave man is honor. Courage implies a moral choice.
- Pain and Pleasure: To the Brave man the end is agreeable but it is obscured by the attendant pain.
-
Chapter X: Self-Mastery Defined
- Sphere of Self-Mastery: Self-Mastery has to do with pleasures and pains. Absence of Self-Control has to do with the same.
- Bodily Pleasures: Self-Mastery is chiefly concerned with the bodily pleasures.
- Desires: Some desires appear to be common to all mankind, others peculiar and acquired.
-
Chapter XI: Absence of Self-Control
- Feelings: The term Absence of Self-Control is applied to errors regarding the feelings.
- Actions: The term is not applied to errors regarding the actions; no one calls those who have been beaten until they cry out, Absence of Self-Control.
- Shame: Absence of Self-Control is more voluntary than cowardice, for the former is caused by pleasure, the latter by pain, and pleasure is an object of choice, pain is not.
-
Chapter XII: Further Distinctions Respecting Self-Control
- Insensibility: The man who falls short in the pursuit of these objects and does not delight in them at all, hardly exists, because such insensibility is scarcely in human nature.
- Definition: Absence of Self-Control then appears to be more voluntary because desire is either a pain, and one flees from pain, or it is not a pain, and one is voluntarily acted on by it.
-
- Book IV - Virtues Concerned with Wealth and Honor
-
Chapter I: Liberality
- Definition: Liberality is the mean state having to do with wealth. The liberal man is praised regarding giving and receiving wealth, especially giving. Wealth includes all things whose worth is measured by money.
- Excess and Defect: The states of excess and defect regarding wealth are prodigality and stinginess, respectively. Prodigals fail to control themselves and spend money on unrestrained gratification. Stinginess is attached to those who are over careful about wealth.
-
Chapter II: Characteristics of Liberality
- Relation to Giving and Taking: It is more characteristic of virtue to do good than to receive it, and to do what is noble rather than to abstain from what is base. A liberal man will give with the motive of doing what is noble and right.
- Giving Appropriately: The liberal man gives to the right people, in the right amounts, at the right time, and fulfills all other conditions of right giving.
- Taking Appropriately: The liberal man takes from the right sources; he is not a taker of everything, and asks for nothing. Taking is necessarily connected with giving.
- Neglect of Property: The liberal man is neglectful of his own property to enable him to perform some virtuous action.
- The Extremes: Neither are men easily made liberal by impoverishment, because then they are no longer able to perform those liberal actions in which virtue consists. The prodigal is incurable because age and poverty will force him to be stingy.
- Liberality and Wealth: Liberality is proportioned to the fortune a man possesses; it does not consist in the largeness of what is given, so much as in the moral state of the giver which prompts the gift. Liberal actions are fairest when the means of performing them come from a man’s own exertions.
-
Chapter III: Magnificence
- Definition: Magnificence is a virtue having to do with wealth, but applies only to expenses that are large. It exceeds liberality in magnitude, involving fitting expense on a large scale. What is "fitting" is relative to the individual and the matter in which he has to spend.
- Ignorance: The magnificent man will not spend to excess or pretentiously, because his motive is honor, not to create a display.
- The Extremes: The man who is in the extreme, exceeding what is right, is called vulgar, and is in want of taste. The deficient man falls short in everything.
-
Chapter IV: Greatness of Soul
- Object: Greatness of soul has for its object great honor. The great-minded man does not value what is commonly esteemed, such as wealth, power, or success in contests.
- The Mean: Great-mindedness is a mean state, having an excess and defect. Those who aim at honor more than they should are called ambitious, and those who fall short are called unambitious.
-
Chapter V: Characteristics of Greatness of Soul
- External Goods: The great-minded man is concerned with honor and dishonor. He will be moderate in regard to wealth and power and all good or bad fortune, however it may happen. He is not overjoyed at success nor grieved over failure.
- Qualities: The great-minded is one who claims much and deserves much. He must be good in a high degree; otherwise his claims will be absurd. Honor is the reward of virtue, and it is to the good that it is given.
- Self-Sufficiency: The truly great-minded man is self-sufficient. He is not fond of encountering small dangers, but only great ones. He is no busybody.
- Truthfulness: He must be open in his hatreds and his friendships. He never feels shame. He is not given to speaking evil of others, even of his enemies.
- Extremes: The man who is deficient in this virtue is called little-minded, and he that exceeds is called conceited.
-
Chapter VI: Love of Honor
- There seems to be a virtue having honor for its object which may seem to bear to Great-mindedness the same relation that liberality does to magnificence. All are praiseworthy who love honor, but not to excess.
-
Chapter VII: Good Temper
- Definition: The mean state has to do with anger. The state is nameless. The extreme states are excess, wrathfulness, and deficiency, lack of spirit.
- The Mean: The man who is in the mean is angry on the right occasions and with the right people; as he ought to be, when he ought to be.
-
Chapter VIII: The Extremes
- The excess is wrathfulness. These men are angry with the wrong persons, at the wrong times, and more than they should be.
- Some are quick-tempered, being soon angry, but quickly reconciled. Ill-temper arises from irritability.
- The deficiency, the lack of spirit, is displayed by one who will not be angry when he ought to be. Such a character is considered foolishly unfeeling.
-
Chapter IX: Agreeableness
- The virtue of agreeableness is the mean in social intercourse. Those who carry on this intercourse with a view to pleasure and pain have been already spoken of; now we will go on to speak of those who are true or false in their words and deeds and in the claims they advance.
- Extremes: Those who aim at being agreeable without any ulterior object are called obsequious if they are aiming to give pleasure, and flatterers if they are aiming at gaining some advantage for themselves. Those who take the opposite line and are disagreeable in all their encounters are called cross and contentious.
-
Chapter X: Truthfulness
- The mean state steers clear of exaggeration, and has no appropriated name. The man in the mean is truthful in word and deed.
- Extremes: The excess is boasting; the defect is irony or mock-modesty.
-
Chapter XI: Playfulness
- There are other qualities that go to make up a finished character. For instance, playfulness. It is a characteristic of the graceful man to say what is suitable and to say it gracefully.
- Extremes: Buffoons are those who study pleasantry more than good breeding, and aim rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is refined and not offensive to the subject of their jokes. The boor is useless and unserviceable in all social intercourse.
-
Chapter XII: Shame
- Not a Virtue: Shame is not a virtue, but a feeling. It is good on a certain supposition, as "if a man should do such things, he would feel Shame".
- Self-Control: Self-control is not properly a virtue, but a kind of mixed state.
-
- Book V - Justice and Injustice
-
Chapter I: Justice as a Moral State
- Focus of Enquiry: The object-matter of justice and injustice, the kind of mean state justice is, and between what points the abstract principle of the Just is a mean.
- Definitions: Justice is a moral state where men are capable of doing what is just, wish to do it, and actually do it. Injustice is a moral state where men act unjustly and wish what is unjust.
-
Chapter II: Justice as Co-extensive with Virtue
- Lawfulness and Fairness: Justice is considered the most excellent of virtues, "more glorious than the evening or morning star". Justice in this broad sense is the same as virtue but differs in essence. It is a complete exercise of virtue.
- Injustice: Injustice, when viewed as co-extensive with vice, relates to actions motivated by pleasure and gain, impacting honor, wealth, or safety.
-
Chapter III: Particular Justice
- There is a kind of injustice different from that which includes all vice, sharing the same name because the definition falls within the same genus. Both relate to interactions with others, but one affects honor, wealth, or safety, driven by pleasure from gain, while the other affects everything within the scope of a good person's actions.
-
Chapter IV: Specific Nature of Particular Justice
- Distinct from Universal Justice: There is more than one kind of justice, with one being distinct from that which is co-extensive with virtue.
- The Just and Unjust: It is necessary to separate the Just and the Unjust involved in these, as most lawful things naturally result in action from virtue in its fullest sense. Laws enjoin living in accordance with each virtue and forbid living in accordance with each vice.
-
Chapter V: Divisions of Particular Justice
- Distributive Justice: Concerned with the distribution of honor, wealth, or other divisible assets of a community among its members, who may receive equal or unequal shares.
- Corrective Justice: Concerned with rectifying unfair transactions between individuals.
-
Chapter VI: Justice as a Mean
- Equality: The unjust man is unequal, and the abstract "Unjust" is unequal. There exists a mean between unequal extremes, which is the equal or exact half.
- Proportionality: The Just is a certain proportionable thing that implies at least four terms: two persons and two shares. The ratio between each pair should be the same.
-
Chapter VII: Corrective Justice
- Role of the Judge: In private transactions, justice serves as a corrective measure. The judge aims to equalize by deducting from the advantage gained by the injurer and adding to the disadvantage suffered by the victim.
- The Mean: Corrective Justice is the mean between loss and gain.
-
Chapter VIII: Distributive Justice
- Proportion: In distribution, the just is what preserves the proportionate. The unjust is a violation of proportion.
- The Mean: The just in distribution is a mean between two extremes, where one party gets too much and another too little. Justice seeks to ensure each person gets their due.
-
Chapter IX: Justice and Reciprocity
- Reciprocity: Some equate reciprocity with justice, but it's not that simple. Reciprocity must be proportional and appropriate to the situation.
- Proportionate Requital: Society is maintained by proportionate requital, where people give back in accordance to what they have received.
-
Chapter X: Justice and the Exchange of Goods
- Need for a Common Measure: For exchange to occur, goods must be comparable. Money serves as a standard of measurement.
- Money's Role: Money is a guarantee that allows for future exchange if there is no immediate need. It is subject to fluctuations in value.
-
Chapter XI: Justice and Political Science
- Justice Requires Law: Justice exists only between those who have laws to govern them. It involves those who can commit injustice.
- Acting Unjustly: Doing injustice does not necessarily imply being unjust. Suffering injustice is distinct from being unjustly treated.
-
Chapter XII: Acting Justly and Unjustly
- Voluntary and Involuntary Actions: Whether one acts justly or is unjustly dealt with must be voluntary.
- Knowledge: An action can be unjust if done knowingly, even if without premeditation.
-
Chapter XIII: Can One Be Unjust to Oneself?
- Distribution: It's possible for the distributor to act unjustly, not the one receiving the larger share.
- Self-harm: Men can suffer somewhat in contradiction of impulses really their own.
- Justice Between Parts of the Soul: Justice exists between parts of the soul, like between ruler and ruled.
-
Chapter XIV: Equity
- Definition: Equity is superior to legal justice. It involves correcting the law where it falls short due to its generality.
- Nature of Equity: Equity is a corrective to legal justice. It addresses cases the law necessarily treats inadequately.
-
Chapter XV: The Relationship Between Justice and Luck
- Actions and Character: The discussion covers the nature of acting unjustly and being unjustly treated, differentiating between actions that reveal character and those that are a matter of luck.
- Choice: It is worse to do than to suffer injustice, because doing injustice is a vice, and is a matter of moral choice.
-
- Book VI - Intellectual Excellence
-
Chapter I: The Need for Right Reason
- Essential Point: Emphasizes the necessity of defining "Right Reason" as a foundation for ethical understanding.
-
Chapter II: Division of the Soul's Excellences
- Two Classes: Identifies Moral and Intellectual excellences as distinct categories within the Soul.
- Rational Soul's Structure: States that the Rational Soul consists of rational and irrational parts.
-
Chapter III: Functions of the Soul in Attaining Truth
- Five Truth-Attaining Faculties: Lists Art, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition as the five faculties through which the Soul attains truth.
- Exclusions: Excludes Supposition and Opinion due to their fallibility.
-
Chapters IV & V: Knowledge and its Characteristics
- Nature of Knowledge: Defines true knowledge as that which cannot be otherwise.
- Uncertainty: Highlights that uncertainty arises concerning things that are mutable or unobserved.
-
Chapter VI: Science and its Domain
- Science's Application: Notes that science is utilized in the arts to achieve the highest accuracy.
- Generality vs. Specificity: Distinguishes between science applied in a general sense versus in a particular context.
-
Chapter VII: Practical Wisdom Defined
- Practical Wisdom's Focus: States that practical wisdom is employed in human affairs and matters open to deliberation.
- Good Counsel: Defines a good counselor as someone capable of attaining the best practical goods for humans through calculation.
-
Chapters VIII & IX: Practical Wisdom and its Varieties
- Politike: Equates Politike (the science of society) and Practical Wisdom, noting they are the same mental state viewed from different perspectives.
- Forms of Practical Wisdom: Identifies legislation as the supreme form, with subordinate functions in action and deliberation.
-
Chapter X: Judiciousness
- There is the faculty of Judiciousness.
-
Chapter XI: Intuition and Wisdom
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapter XII: Importance of Practical Wisdom and Moral Virtue
- Human Achievement: Declares that human achievement is accomplished through Practical Wisdom and Moral Virtue, with Moral Virtue setting the right aims and Practical Wisdom providing the means.
-
Chapter XIII: Cleverness
- Describes cleverness as a faculty that enables one to achieve any proposed end, but notes that Practical Wisdom isn't identical to cleverness but requires the ability to adapt means to ends.
-
Chapter XIV: Understanding
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapter XV: The Relation of Wisdom and Practical Wisdom to Each Other
- Demonstration and Knowledge: Notes that one who possesses knowledge through demonstration must have firm beliefs in their principles, even more so than in the conclusions.
- Highlights that to truly know something is to be absolutely infallible.
-
- Book VII - Self-Control (Continence) and Lack of Self-Control (Incontinence)
-
Chapter I: Moral States to be Avoided
- Three negative forms: States that Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness are the three forms of moral character to be avoided.
- Contraries: Notes that Virtue is contrary to Vice and Self-Control is contrary to Imperfect Self-Control.
- Superhuman Virtue: Suggests that Superhuman Virtue is the state best suited as the contrary to Brutishness, indicating a level of excellence beyond normal human capacity.
-
Chapter II: Self-Control, Endurance, and Pleasure
- Good Traits: Notes that Self-Control and Endurance are considered good and worthy of choice.
- Bad Traits: States that Absence of Self-Control and Softness are bad and to be avoided.
- The Problem of Pleasure: Poses the question of whether every pleasant thing is inherently good or if pleasure is good only in a qualified sense.
-
Chapter III: The Problem of Acting Against One's Knowledge
- The central question: Is whether those who lack self-control act with knowledge or without knowledge.
- Explores the possibility of how someone can fail to act according to what they know to be right.
-
Chapter IV: Defining Imperfect Self-Control
- Asks if 'Imperfect Self-Control' describes a specific character or applies to people only in certain situations.
- Seeks to define what the actions of someone lacking self-control are directed towards.
-
Chapter V: Contrasting Self-Control and Lack of Self-Control
- Acknowledges people may overcome temptations others succumb to, and vice versa.
- Character Definitions: Defines Self-Control, Imperfect Self-Control, Softness, and Endurance relative to pleasures and pains.
- Most people's moral state lies somewhere in between these extremes, though leaning towards the worse characters.
-
Chapter VI: The Mean in Relation to Self-Control
- Self-Control as the Mean: Presents the person with Self-Control as the midpoint between those who lack it and those who take too little pleasure in bodily enjoyments.
- Reasons for Not Abiding by Reason: Suggests that the person who lacks Self-Control fails to follow reason because of excess, while those deficient in self-mastery fail because of a deficiency.
- The Man of Self-Control abides by reason.
-
Chapters VII-IX: Pleasure and its Role
- Pleasure and Social Science: States that the examination of pleasure and pain belongs to the social-science philosopher, who uses it to define what is good and evil.
- Pains, Pleasures, Moral Vice, and Virtue: Notes that Moral Virtue and Vice both relate to pleasure and pain.
- The reasons alleged do not prove Pleasure either to be not-good or the Chief Good.
-
Chapters X-XIV: The Nature of Pleasure
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapters XV: Bodily Pleasures
- Bodily Pleasure and Pain: Bodily Pleasure is pursued to drive out Pain.
- Excess: Because pain is felt in excess, people pursue pleasure in excess, especially bodily pleasure, as a remedy.
- Side by Side: These remedies become violent because of being looked at side by side with their contraries.
-
- Book VIII - Friendship
-
Chapter I: The Importance of Friendship
- Virtue and Connection: Friendship is either itself a virtue or closely connected with virtue.
- Necessity for Life: Friendship is essential for life; no one would choose to live without friends, even with all other good things.
- Needs of the Prosperous: The wealthy and powerful need friends to do kindnesses and maintain their position.
- Refuge in Adversity: In poverty and misfortune, friends are considered the only refuge.
-
Chapter II: Questions About Friendship
- Focus on Human Aspects: Discussion will focus on aspects related to human morals, characters, and feelings.
- Who Can Be Friends?: Raises questions about whether friendship is possible for all or impossible for bad people.
- Types of Friendship: Explores whether there is only one type of friendship or several.
-
Chapter III: Objects of Friendship
- Specific Objects: Friendship is directed toward specific objects: what is good, pleasurable, or useful.
- Usefulness: Usefulness is a means to attain good or pleasure.
- Subjective vs. Objective Good: Friendship is felt toward what is good to the individual, while abstractly, it is the real good that is the object of friendship.
- Impression of Being Good: Individuals feel friendship for what conveys the impression of being good to themselves.
- Mutual Knowledge: Friendship requires mutual kindly feelings and awareness of these feelings.
-
Chapter IV: Types of Friendship
- Three Types: There are three species of friendship, corresponding to its objects: friendships based on goodness, pleasure, and utility, each involving "mutual affection mutually known".
-
Chapter V: Imperfect Friendships
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapter VI: Friendship as a State and as an Activity
- Living Together: Those who live together share pleasure and impart good, but those separated do not perform acts of friendship.
- Distance: Distance itself doesn't affect friendship but prevents its active expression.
- Forgetfulness: Prolonged absence can cause forgetfulness of friendship.
-
Chapter VII: Friendship of the Good
- Friendship par excellence: Connection between good people is friendship in its highest form.
- Qualities of the Good: The good man combines pleasantness and usefulness.
- Friendship and Goodness: The good man can feel Friendship only for, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other.
-
Chapter VIII: Equality in Friendship
- Forms of Equality: Friendships exist in equality when both receive the same benefits and wish the same things, or when they exchange different things (e.g., pleasure for profit).
- Intensity and Permanence: Friendships based on exchange are less intense and less permanent.
-
Chapter IX: Friendship and Justice
- Common Object-Matter: Friendship and justice have the same object-matter and exist between the same persons.
- Communion: Every community involves some principle of justice and friendship.
- Friendship Co-extensive with Communion: The extent of friendship corresponds to the extent of the communion.
- Common Goods: "The goods of friends are common," as friendship rests upon communion.
-
Chapter X: Political Friendship
- Three Types of Constitution: Kingship, Aristocracy, and Timocracy are the three types of political constitutions.
- Deflections: Deflections from these are Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy.
- Brotherhood: Timocracy finds its type in the relation of brothers.
-
Chapter XI: Friendship and Political Systems
- Friendship Attendant on Constitution: Each form of political constitution has a corresponding type of friendship.
- Kingship: Friendship between a king and his subjects involves a superiority of benefit, with the king caring for their welfare.
- Paternal Friendship: Paternal friendship exceeds the kingly type in benefits, as the father provides being, maintenance, and education.
- Fraternal Friendship: Fraternal friendship resembles that of companions, with brothers being equal in age and having similar feelings.
- Despotism: In Despotism there is little or no Friendship.
-
Chapter XII: Kinds of Relationships
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapter XIII: Equality and Inequality in Friendship
- Three Kinds of Friendship: Friendship can be based on goodness, pleasantness, or advantage.
- Equalization: Those who are equal should be equalized by the degree of their friendship, while those unequal should render friendship in proportion to the other party's superiority.
-
Chapter XIV: Limits to Wishing Good
- Wishing the Highest Goods: Raises the question of whether friends wish each other the very highest goods, like becoming gods.
- Maintaining Friendship: Wishes must consider maintaining the friend's current state as a human.
- Self-Interest: Each person desires good for themselves most of all.
-
Chapter XV: Problems with Contraries
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapter XVI: Importance of Shared Activities
- Intimacy: Intimacy is most prized by friends, as friendship is communion.
- Perception of Existence: Just as a person values their own existence, they value the existence of their friend.
- Learning from the Good: From good friends, one learns good things.
-
- Book IX - Friendship Continued
-
Chapter I: Dissimilar Friendships
- Proportionate Equalization: In friendships between unequals, proportionality maintains the bond.
- In social interactions like trade, money serves as a common measure to ensure fairness between different goods or services.
- In love, the imbalance occurs when one friend values pleasure while the other values utility, leading to conflict when these qualities change.
- Permanent Friendship: Friendship based on moral character is lasting and disinterested.
- Proportionate Equalization: In friendships between unequals, proportionality maintains the bond.
-
Chapter II: Conflicts of Obligation
- Dilemmas in Duty: Examines conflicting claims in friendships and other relationships.
- Whether to prioritize a father's demands over a doctor's advice or a friend over a good person, especially when resources are limited.
- These questions highlight the complexity of moral decisions in personal relationships.
- Dilemmas in Duty: Examines conflicting claims in friendships and other relationships.
-
Chapter III: Breaking off Friendships
- Conditional Friendships: Friendships based on utility or pleasure are justifiably ended when those benefits or affections cease.
- The initial basis of the friendship is no longer valid.
- Moral Degeneration: If a friend becomes morally corrupt, one should attempt to correct them.
- If attempts fail, the friendship should be dissolved, as one cannot be friends with someone who is base.
- Minor Faults: Friendships should not be broken for small faults; instead, offer support, as true friendship is rare.
- Conditional Friendships: Friendships based on utility or pleasure are justifiably ended when those benefits or affections cease.
-
Chapter IV: Friendly Feelings and Self-Love
- Origin in Self-Love: Friendly feelings towards others originate from feelings towards oneself.
- Qualities attributed to friends mirror those one has for oneself.
- Definitions of a Friend: A friend is seen as one who:
- Wishes and does good for the other's sake
- Wants the friend to exist and live for the friend's sake
- Shares life and common interests
- Shares joys and sorrows
- Friend as Another Self: Good people feel these things for themselves, suggesting a friend is essentially another self.
- Origin in Self-Love: Friendly feelings towards others originate from feelings towards oneself.
-
Chapter V: Goodwill
- Distinct from Friendship: Goodwill resembles friendship, but lacks the mutual awareness and intimacy required for true friendship.
- Goodwill can extend to strangers, friendship cannot.
- Not Affection: Goodwill lacks the intensity and desire characteristic of affection.
- Incidental: Goodwill often arises from a good deed or service, creating a temporary favorable disposition toward the benefactor.
- It's a starting point for friendship if it leads to familiarity and trust.
- Distinct from Friendship: Goodwill resembles friendship, but lacks the mutual awareness and intimacy required for true friendship.
-
Chapter VI: Concord
- Political Analogy: Concord is likened to political friendship, aiming at shared advantage.
- Shared Judgement: Concord exists when citizens share the same judgments, pursue common interests, and act on collective decisions.
- Among the Good: Concord is fully realized among virtuous individuals who agree on what is best and strive together towards those goals.
- Among the Base: The base only seek personal gain and distrust each other, making true concord impossible.
-
Chapter VII: Benefactors and Beneficiaries
- Why Benefactors Love More: Benefactors tend to love their beneficiaries more than the reverse.
- Creator's Love: This is analogous to an artist's or poet's love for their creation, as the benefactor sees the beneficiary as their "work".
- Cost and Action: Benefactors invest more effort, and activity is more pleasing than passivity.
- Self-Love: Giving is noble and associated with self-love, whereas receiving is merely useful.
- Attachment: Beneficiaries feel affection if they can reciprocate, but if not, there is no friendship.
- Injustice: Benefactors wish well for those they have helped, hoping they continue to benefit.
-
Chapter VIII: Self-Love
- Question of Propriety: Is it right to love oneself most, or someone else?
- Reproach of Self-Lovers: Self-lovers are criticized as selfish, while good people act from honor and for friends, ignoring their own interests.
- Good Self-Love: A good person's self-love involves striving for virtue, benefiting both themselves and others.
- Such individuals are intensely self-loving because they sacrifice wealth, power, and even life for noble causes.
- Bad Self-Love: Bad people indulge their appetites, harming themselves and their community.
- Harmony: The good person’s actions are aligned with reason, benefiting both self and friends.
-
Chapter IX: Happiness and Activity
- The Happy Man: The happy person needs friends because humans are social beings.
- Continuous Activity: Friendship involves continuous shared activity.
- Pleasure of Society: The virtuous find pleasure in each other’s company, as their actions are inherently agreeable.
- Mutual Improvement: Friendship enhances virtue through mutual imitation and learning.
- Number of Friends: There's a limit to the number of friends one can have to maintain intimacy and mutual connection.
- Good Fortune: Friends make good fortune more enjoyable.
- Misfortune: Friends lighten the burden of misfortune by sharing grief.
- Friends as Refuge: Friends are a refuge in sorrow.
-
Chapter X: Shared Grief
- Lighter Burden: Sharing grief with friends lightens the burden.
- How Much Grief: Questions how much friends should share in another’s sorrows.
- Avoid Sullenness: One should avoid appearing sullen by rejecting friends' sympathy.
- Friends' Presence: Under all circumstances, the presence of friends is valuable.
-
Chapter XI: The Need for Friends
- Prosperity and Adversity: Friends are valuable in both good and bad times.
- Adversity: Friends provide help and support.
- Prosperity: Friends offer opportunities to do good and provide companionship.
-
Chapter XII: Intimacy with Friends
- Value of Intimacy: Intimacy is most prized among friends, as friendship is a form of communion.
- Self-Awareness: Just as one values their own existence, they value the existence of their friend.
- Shared Life: Sharing life with friends makes one more aware of their own existence and worth.
-
Chapter XIII: Living Together
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapter XIV: Limits to Wishing Good
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapter XV: Problems with Contraries
- Not relevant according to the source.
-
Chapter XVI: Importance of Shared Activities
- Learning from the Good: One learns good things from good friends, implying moral and intellectual growth through companionship.
-
- Book X. Pleasure and Happiness
-
Chapter I: Pleasure's Connection to Human Nature
- Pleasure is closely tied to human nature.
- It's a primary tool for training the young.
- People naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain.
-
Chapter II: Examining the Views on Pleasure
- Eudoxus believed pleasure was the ultimate good.
- He saw all creatures aiming for it.
- Its opposite, pain, is universally avoided.
- Arguments against pleasure being the Chief Good
- Some pleasures are disgraceful [n/a].
- Pleasure is a process, not an end [n/a].
- Eudoxus believed pleasure was the ultimate good.
-
Chapter III: Defining Pleasure
- Pleasure is complete at any moment.
- It's a 'whole'.
- Unlike a movement or process.
- Pleasure accompanies activity.
- Pleasure is complete at any moment.
-
Chapter IV: Pleasure and Activity
- Pleasure perfects activity.
- Like youth and bloom in the young [n/a].
- The best activity is the most pleasant.
- It's the activity of the best faculty on the best object.
- Different activities yield different pleasures.
- The pleasure of contemplation differs from that of sensation [n/a].
- Pleasure perfects activity.
-
Chapter V: Happiness Revisited
- Happiness is the ultimate end of human existence.
- It's not merely a state but an activity.
- It's chosen for its own sake.
- It is self-sufficient.
- Amusement vs. Happiness
- Amusement is not the End, it is for the sake of something further.
- Amusement is like rest.
- Happiness is the ultimate end of human existence.
-
Chapter VI: Contemplation and Happiness
- Happiness is found in activities conforming to virtue.
- The highest happiness is contemplation.
- It is an activity of the intellect.
- It aims at no end beyond itself.
- It is self-sufficient, allows for rest, and is continuous.
-
Chapter VII: The Contemplative Life
- The contemplative life is the happiest [n/a].
- It engages with what is most divine in us [n/a].
- Intellect is the highest faculty [n/a].
- Contemplation is the most continuous activity [n/a].
- It is also the most pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely [n/a].
- The practically wise and just also need virtuous actions [n/a].
- External prosperity is also needed [n/a].
- The contemplative life is the happiest [n/a].
-
Chapter VIII: Practical and Intellectual Virtue
- Happiness is activity in accordance with virtue [n/a].
- Some identify happiness with virtue [n/a].
- External goods are necessary for happiness [n/a].
- For performing noble acts [n/a].
- The activity of the intellect is superior [n/a].
- Happiness is activity in accordance with virtue [n/a].
-
Chapter IX: The Need for Laws and Education
- Laws are needed to guide people to the good [n/a].
- Character formation requires education.
- Habits must be instilled from a young age [n/a].
- Parental care is important [n/a].
-
Chapter X: The Importance of Legislation
- The state plays a vital role in fostering virtue.
- Through laws and education [n/a].
- A science of legislation is needed.
- To make citizens good and law-abiding.
- The end goal is well-living and well-doing.
- The state plays a vital role in fostering virtue.
-
opening map…